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Abstract
Research on natural language understanding has often focused on
the problem of analyzing the structure and meaning of isolated
sentences. To understand whole texts or dialogues, these
sentences must be seen as elements whose significance resides in
the contribution they make to the larger whole. A computer
natural language understanding system must interpret each
sentence with respect to both the linguistic context established
by preceding sentences and the real-world setting. This paper
reviews work on these issues, examining theories of the structure
of discourse, the semantics of discourse, speech acts and
pragmatics, and different communication modalities.
Discourse Understanding
1. Introduction
The term Discourse Understanding refers to all processes of
Natural Language Understanding that attempt to understand a text
or dialogue. For such processes, the sentences of natural
language are elements whose significance resides in the
contribution they make to the development of a larger whole,
rather than being independent, isolated units of meaning. To
understand discourse, one must track the structure of an
unfolding text or dialogue and interpret every new utterance with
respect to the proper context--taking into account the real-world
setting of the utterance, as well as the linguistic context built
up by the utterances preceding it. The problems of Discourse
Understanding are thus closely related to those dealt with in the
linguistic discipline of Pragmatics which studies the context
dependence of utterance meanings.
Research on natural language understanding systems has often
focused on the problem of analyzing the structure and meaning of
isolated sentences. To deal with discourse instead, a system
must have all the capabilities necessary for sentence
understanding, but, in addition, it must be able to apply rules of
discourse structure, which specify how sentences may be combined
to form texts or dialogues.
Even with such discourse-level extensions, however, a purely
linguistic approach can only construct the meaning of a text
insofar as it follows from the meaning of its constituent
utterances and the explicitly stated relations between them. In
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Artificial Intelligence one tends to take a broader perspective,
which emphasizes the role of world knowledge in discourse
understanding. By taking into account common sense knowledge
about the world, a system may derive semantic relations between
constituents of the text that are not stated explicitly, but that
may be plausibly assumed. By invoking scripts and frames, a
system may analyze a text against the background of default
assumptions about "normal" situations and "normal" courses of
events, thereby filling in information left implicit in the text,
and also noticing when something deviates from the usual pattern
and is therefore worthy of special attention. In this way, a
more complete understanding of the intended meaning of the text
may be created.
A discourse understanding system worthy of that name should
not only deal correctly with what is true or false in the world
according to its input text, but should, at the same time, be
able to distinguish between more and less important information--
between what is crucial and what is mere background. With this
capacity, a system would be able to generate adequate summaries
of its input texts. A further level of understanding would
involve the ability to infer what the "point" of a story or
description is--to discover the more abstract, culturally
relevant message which is instantiated by the text.
Much of the AI research on discourse understanding is
oriented towards developing systems to exhibit reasonable and
cooperative behavior in a goal-directed interaction with a human
dialogue-partner. Such systems would do more than understand the
literal meanings of the utterances of their interlocutor; they
would have to be able to assess, to some extent, the intentions
and purposes behind these utterances. Methods to achieve this
are usually based on the theory of Speech Acts: The system
recognizes the goals which are conventionally associated with
various types of utterances, such as assertions, questions,
commands, and requests. Understanding an utterance at a deeper
level is then viewed as establishing what goal the speaker wanted
to achieve by performing the speech act, and what role the speech
act plays in achieving that goal. Often, the goal can be seen as
a subgoal which plays a role in achieving a higher level goal,
and so on. By invoking plausible hypotheses about the goals the
speaker may have, and about the methods she may employ to achieve
them, a system may infer the intention behind a speech act.
Empirical studies of human discourse usually deal with real-
time oral communication or with written texts. Discourse-
understanding computer programs, however, will usually employ a
video display terminal to communicate with their users in real
time. They will thus use a new natural language interaction-mode
which did not exist before. It is therefore of some interest to
study how the properties of discourse depend on the interaction
mode--e.g., on the amount of shared environment between the
participants and on the sensory modality of the communication
medium.
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Each of the main topics mentioned above will be discussed
below in some detail:
* the structure of discourse
* the semantics of discourse
* speech acts and pragmatics
* different I/O modalities
2. The Structure of Discourse
2.1 Introduction
To understand a text or dialogue, one must understand the
relations between its parts. Clearly, these parts are not just
the individual sentences; sentences are joined together to form
larger units, which in their turn may be the building blocks of
yet larger units. Discourse understanding must thus be based on
some characterization of the way in which a discourse is built up
out of constituent units.
Unlike the smooth, steady development of a central idea which
characterizes the texts we read in books, journals and
newspapers, everyday spoken discourse is characterized by
interruptions, resumptions, backtracking and jumping ahead of
oneself. Somehow, despite the apparent "disfluency" of everyday
discourse, speakers and hearers manage to follow what is going on
and to produce responses to one another which are situationally
appropriate and which demonstrate an understanding of all of the
"underspecified" items of meaning which are found in sentences.
They understand who is being referred to by words such as "he"
and "it," can recover the referent of phrases like "the one over
there" or "the one we were just talking about," and manage to
orient themselves in "discourse time and space" by correctly
assigning temporal and spatial referents to words like "now" and
"here,1" whose meaning is totally context dependent.
2.1.1 Modeling discourse structure: The complexity of the
problem. Faced with transcripts of natural interactions,
analysts experience serious difficulties locating the
"descriptions," "explanations," "stories," "plans" or other
structural units which they may know have been "there" when the
interaction was happening. With the move to the analysis phase,
structural units become lost in all the "talk."
In order to illustrate the problem of locating a coherent
discourse semantic unit in natural talk, let us take the
following example modified from a corpus of Spatial Planning
dialogues. There are five people involved: two primary
speakers, A and B, who are jointly planning a journey in Europe
in connection with a trip simulation in an experimental setting.
C and D are researchers conducting the experiment, and E is a
secretary who came by.
A. We are in Spain, o.k. So, let's go to France next.
I love France anyway. We had a great time there last
year. And then Italy did I tell you about the little
restaurant we went to in Florence?
B. Yeah. I think you did. It was better than the place in
Rome we ate at before we took the plane. But,
anyway, no. Let's go to Belgium next., Then
C. Could you move closer to the camera, please.
D. You're out of range
A. O.K. yeah. But not if we have to go through
Antwerp
B. Then Holland
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A. When do we do Italy then? We can't miss it?
B. On the way back to
E. Sorry. I was looking for Dave
C. He's not here. We're running an experiment I'll
talk to you later. You are still out of camera
range, by the way
A. Good
B. Anyway. I saw the tulips last year. What about
Italy?
A. On the way back to Spain. You taking a vacation
this year? Or loafing at work as usual?
B. Haven't decided, you?
A. Might go to Spain again. Then Germany's next,
right?
Competent language users would intuitively segment this
discourse into sections in which A and B are planning--actually
developing their plan--and other sections where they are
commenting on places they have been, making small talk, or
conversing with the researchers. In one exchange, neither A nor
B are talking at all, but are listening in while C exchanges some
quick words with the secretary who is looking for someone who is
not there. In order to make it somewhat easier to find the
"planning," we have arranged the text graphically as an outline,
showing the "planning talk" in leftmost position and moving
further to the right to represent the embedded or secondary
status of the comments and other interruptions to the development
of the plan. It should be noted that when other types of talk are
completed, A and B return to developing their plan, which is the
focus of their attention throughout this excerpt.
A. We are in Spain, o.k.
So, let's go to France next.
I love France anyway.
We had a great time there last year.
And then Italy
did I tell you about the little restaurant we
went to in Florence?
B. Yeah.
I think you did.
It was better than the place in Rome we ate at
before we took the plane .
(But, anyway, no.)
Let's go to Belgium next.
Then
C. Could you move closer to the camera, please.
D. You're out of range
A. O.K. yeah.
But not if we have to go through Antwerp
B. Then Holland.
A. When do we do Italy then?
We can't miss it?
B. On the way back to
E. Sorry.
I was looking for Dave
C. He's not here.
We're running an experiment
I'll talk to you later
You are still out of camera range, by the way
B. (Anyway.)
I saw the tulips last year.
What about Italy?
A. On the way back to Spain.
You taking a vacation this year?
Or loafing at work as usual?
B. Haven't decided, you?
A. Might go to Spain for a few days.
Then Germany's next, right?
Although this outlining procedure may make it easier to see
at a glance which clauses encode propositions which can be
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interpreted as proposals relating to the sequence of actions to
be taken in some future time "Plan Execution World," not all
leftmost clauses represent proposals which were taken into the
final plan decided upon. Some proposals were made and then
accepted--like A's suggestion to visit "France" after "Spain"
which was accepted by B without comment--while other suggestions,
such as A's next proposal to visit "Italy" next, were not
accepted and were not included in the final agreed-upon plan.
The plan at the point in the game we are considering, as
finally agreed upon, consisted of a hypothetical itinerary which
would take A and B to:
Spain, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
(Italy (Spain))
in this sequence.
It is important to notice how many different parameters must
be monitored in order to recover this itinerary:
* Temporal reference points must be maintained and, if
necessary, updated (to understand "when" in conceptual
time an event would take place).
* Spatial reference points must be maintained and, if
necessary, updated (to understand the speaker's
orientation in conceptual space)
* The identity of the speaker and hearer must
be available (to be able to recover the intended
referents of "I" and You)
* The specific "world" in which events are to take place
(or have taken place) must be known (in order to
interpret a spatial location or temporal reference
point in the "Game" world or in the "real" world i.e.,
A is planning to vacation in Spain "this year" in the
"real" world; A had a great time in France "last year"
in the "real" world. "A" and "B" tokens in the "Game"
world are in Spain and "planning a trip" from Spain, to
France, Belgium etc.)
In addition, it must be pointed out that correctly
interpreting this discourse involves understanding the form and
function of a number of linguistic and rhetorical structures,
including:
* Narrative syntax-mechanisms, encoding update of
reference points
* Sentential syntax and semantics
* Question/answer sequences
* Discourse "operators" such as "o.k.," "yes," "no,"
"well," "anyway" which do not add independent
information but which either (1) affirm or deny
information available elsewhere (2) indicate a
digression or a "return" to another topic
* Joking conventions (such as insulting a hard worker by
accusing him of "loafing on the job.")
* Discourse embedding and return conventions
2.2 Recent Directions In Modeling Discourse Structure
Recent advances in understanding the structure of natural
language discourse make it possible to segment complex talk and
recover the integrity of "discourse units," despite the
complexity of the actual talk in which they occur. An important
research focus within the past five years has been to capture the
semantic or "coherence" relations among clauses and segments
making up a text in which all of the constituent elements
function together to communicate a set of mutually interconnected
ideas (Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Hobbs, 1979; Hobbs, 1985; Mann &
Thompson, 1983; and Polanyi, 1985). A second research focus has
been to understand the structural relations obtaining even in
discourses which are not coherent, but which are characterized by
interruptions and resumptions, and even by hesitations and other
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types of complex phenomena arising from the social and processing
constraints on actual talk (Reichman, 1981; Polanyi & Scha, 1984;
Grosz & Sidner, 1986; and Hinrichs & Polanyi, 1986).
Section 2.2.1 below reviews some discussions of coherence
relations in discourse. Sections 2.2.2-2.2.6 discuss some
frameworks which attempt to characterize the structure of
discourse--accounting for coherence, while also allowing for
digressions and interruptions.
2.2.1 Discourse coherence. It has been observed many times
that not every sequence of sentences makes up a "text." In a
well-formed text the sentences are perceived as working together
to build up a unified whole, by expressing propositions which are
related to each other in a limited number of specific ways.
A number of coherence relations which may obtain among the
constituents of a well-formed text have been identified, for
instance, by Hobbs (1979, 1985). He describes how a semantic
structure for a whole discourse may be built up recursively by
recognizing coherence relations between adjacent segments of a
text. He addresses himself initially to why it is that we find
discourses coherent at all--what are the sources of discourse
coherence? Not surprisingly, one source of discourse coherence
lies in the coherence of the world or object described. We can
find a text coherent if it tells us about a set of objects or
states or events which we know to be coherent. Thus, even a
gasped out, highly-interrupted narrative of a disaster may appear
"coherent" and be "understandable" when we bring to the text our
belief that the disaster formed a coherent set of events, related
causally to one another and affecting in various ways the people,
objects, and situations described. This relates closely to
another source of discourse coherence: When we find that one
assertion details the cause for the situation described by the
next assertion, we view the sequence as coherent. We will also
find a sequence of two sentences, two stories, or, generally
speaking, two discourse constituents to be coherently related to
one another if one tells us more detail about the other, offers
an explanation, or otherwise gives more information about the
proposition expressed by the other.
Hobbs provides a method for allowing the coherence relations
in a discourse to emerge. He suggests segmenting the discourse
"intuitively" and then labelling the various naturally occurring
segments with the coherence relation(s) which tie them to
immediately preceding constituents. There will be two types of
relations: coordination and subordination relations. Coordinate
coherence relations include parallel constructions and
elaborations in which one discovers a common proposition as the
assertion of the composite segment. Subordination relations
obtain when one constituent provides background or explanatory
information with respect to another. Hobbs' ideas of "coherence"
allow us to see how even the subsequent moves in a conversation,
which may appear incoherent to an outside observer, may be
appropriate conversational moves for the participants--entirely
coherent and describable with the relations which he has outlined
(Hobbs & Evans, 1980; and Hobbs & Agar, 1985).
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Mann and Thompson's work on rhetorical relations focuses
exclusively on the relations which obtain within a coherent text
(Mann & Thompson, 1983). They assign a phrase structure
analysis to texts, in which two subsequent constituents can be
related through each of a number of specific relations. Their
inventory of coherence relations is more detailed than that
provided by Hobbs. The relations they list are solutionhood,
evidence, justification, motivation, reason, sequence,
enablement, elaboration, restatement, condition, circumstance,
cause, concession, background, and thesis-antithesis.
2.2.2 Discourse structure and pronoun resolution. In early
work on the structure of Task Oriented Dialogues, Grosz (1974)
provided an important demonstration of the hierarchical structure
of natural texts. In the analysis of talk between an apprentice
and an expert dismantling a water pump, she showed that the
discourse could be represented as a tree or outline in which the
relationships among the clauses could be chunked in a way which
replicated the goal/subgoal structure of the original task.
Perhaps not surprisingly, in taking apart one part of the pump,
the talk would focus on that operation; when the apprentice had
finished dealing with that aspect of the job, and moved on to the
next subtask, the talk would move along, reflecting in its
structure what was going on in the joint endeavor. What was
surprising, and most significant, however, was that the choice of
possible referents for pronouns in the text reflected the
structure of the task as well. In discussing a part of the
object involved in the task at hand, one could refer to it with a
pronoun; similarly, one could refer to the entire higher level
unit with a pronoun, or even to the pump as a whole. It was not
possible to use a pronoun to refer to the objects and subtasks
involved in a part of the task which had already been completed.
In the tree of the discourse task/subtask elements one was
blocked from referring to a task element in a branch to the left
of the branch currently being developed. Grosz's discovery,
therefore, was that discourse has a structure in which the
placement and semantic relations obtaining among the clauses
making up the discourse plays a decisive role in the
interpretation of given elements in that discourse.
Sidner (1983) has shown that a structurally analogous
account of anaphora resolution also applies at a linguistic level
of discourse structure which is independent of task structure.
In her model, the candidates for anaphoric reference are stored in
a stack. An incoming discourse constituent which is treated as
embedded PUSHes new focused elements into this list, while the
resumption of a suspended discourse constituent POPs the
intervening focus elements off the stack.
In the next section we shall give brief overviews of three
frameworks which build on this seminal work and provide more
comprehensive accounts of the issues involved in understanding
both "coherent" and "interrupted" discourse: Reichman's Contest
Space Theory (Reichman, 1981), Discourse Structures Theory
developed by Grosz and Sidner (1986), and Polanyi and Scha's
Dynamic Discourse Model (Polanyi & Scha, 1984; Polanyi, 1985; and
Hinrichs, & Polanyi, 1986).
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2.2.3 Context space theory. Reichman's context space
theory deals with the structure of conversation (Reichman, 1981).
It associates with each topic of discussion a context space--a
schematic structure with a number of slots. These slots hold the
following information:
* a propositional representation of the set of
functionally related utterances said to lie in
this context space;
* the communicative function served by the utterances in
this context space;
* a marker reflecting the foreground-background status of
this context space at any given point in the
conversation;
* focus level assignments to the discourse elements in
this context space;
* links to preceding context spaces in relation to
which this context space was developed; and
* specification of the relations involved.
The utterances that constitute the discourse are analyzed as
"conversational moves" which affect the content of the various
context spaces. Reichman has paid special attention to the
conversational structures involved in arguments. Among the
conversational moves she identifies, for instance, are assertion
of a claim, explanation, illustration, support, challenge,
interruption, and further development.
An important and influential part of Reichman's theory is
her treatment of clue-words--devices which speakers use to
indicate when their discourse shifts from one structural level to
another. Clue-words are commonly divided into PUSH-markers and
POP-markers. PUSH-markers are linguistic signals that indicate
the initiation of a new embedded discourse constituent. Examples
are "like," "by the way," "for instance." POP-markers have the
complementary function. They close off the currently active
embedded unit and signal a return to a higher level of structure.
Examples are: "Well," "so," "anyway," "OK."
An extensive study of clue words in spoken French is
presented by Guelich (1970). Schiffrin (1982) did an extensive
study for English. Merritt (1978) discusses the use of "OK" in
service encounters. Cohen (1984) studied clue words from a
computational perspective. She draws two important conclusions:
* clue words decrease the amount of processing needed
to understand coherent discourse.
* clue words allow the understanding of discourse that
would otherwise be incomprehensible.
While Reichman's work provided much important insight into
the functioning of discourse, her Context Space formalism fails
to distinguish between those cases in which one can return to a
previous topic by use of a simple POP, for example, and those
cases in which such a simple, purely structural, return is not
possible and one must re-introduce the topic in order to continue
talking about it. Reichman's Context Spaces are never "closed
off" and inaccessible because one can always say anything one
wishes, and continuing to talk about a matter dropped earlier is
certainly possible. Discourse structural relations, in her
account, are thus finally obscured by discourse semantic
relations obtaining among the topics of talk in the various
units.
The work of both Grosz and Sidner (1986) and Polanyi and
Scha (1984; Polanyi, 1985; Hinrichs & Polanyi, 1986),
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incorporates elements of Reichman's work--particularly her
treatment of clue words--while separating structural and semantic
relations between clauses. This separation allows for a
treatment of "interruptions" and "resumptions" which is based on
structural properties of the discourse, rather than being
dependent on semantic relationships among topics of talk. These
two frameworks generalize upon Grosz's early work by providing an
account of discourse structure which is not task dependent.
2.3 The Discourse Structures Theory
In the view of Grosz and Sidner (1986), the structure of a
discourse results from three interacting components: a
linguistic structure, an intentional structure, and an
attentional state. These three components deal with different
aspects of the utterances in a discourse. Grosz and Sidner have
particularly focused on the intentional and the attentional
aspects of discourse.
The intentional structure is a hierarchical structure which
describes relations between the purpose of the discourse and the
purpose of discourse segments. These purposes (such as "Intend
that a particular agent perform a particular talk" or "Intend
that a particular agent believe a particular fact") are linked by
relations of dominance (between a goal and a subgoal) or ordering
(between two goals which must be achieved in a specific order).
The attentional state is an abstraction of the participants'
focus of attention as their discourse unfolds. The attention
state is a property of discourse, not of discourse participants.
It is inherently dynamic, recording the object, properties, and
relations that are salient at each point in the discourse. The
attentional state is represented by a stack of focus spaces.
Changes in attentional state are modeled by a set of transition
rules that specify the conditions for adding and deleting spaces.
A focus space is associated with each discourse segment;
this space contains those entities that are salient--either
because they have been mentioned explicitly in the segment, or
because they became salient in the process of producing or
comprehending the utterances in the segment (as in Grosz's, 1974,
original work on focusing). The focus space also includes the
discourse segment purpose; this reflects the fact that the
discourse participants are focused not only on what they are
talking about, but also on why they are talking about it.
Discourse Structures Theory provides a unified account of
both the intentional and attentional dimensions of discourse
understanding and makes explicit important links between the two.
The Dynamic Discourse Model, on the other hand, is more limited
in its scope. It provides an account of the discourse
segmentation process on an utterance-by-utterance basis and is
thus a more developed theory of the strictly linguistic aspects
of the discourse understanding process.
2.3.1 The dynamic discourse model. The Dynamic Discourse
Model (DDM) (Polanyi & Scha, 1984; Polanyi, 1985; and Hinrichs &
Polanyi, 1986) is a formal theory of discourse syntactic and
semantic structure which accounts for how a semantic and
pragmatic interpretation of a discourse may be incrementally
built up from its constituent clauses.
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The DDM is presented as a discourse parser. The parser
segments the discourse into linguistically and socially relevant
units on a clause-by-clause basis by proceeding through the
discourse, examining the syntactic encoding form of each clause,
its propositional content, and its situation of utterance.
The Model consists of a set of discourse grammars which
specify the constituents of possible discourse units, a set of
recursive rules of discourse formation which specify how units
may relate to one another, and a set of semantic interpretation
rules which assign a semantic and pragmatic interpretation to
each clause and to the discourse as a whole.
Each discourse is viewed as composed of discourse units
which can be of many different types: jokes, stories, plans,
question/answer sequences, lists, "narratives" (temporally
ordered lists), and Speech Events, socially situated occasions of
talk such as doctor/patient interactions, and everyday
conversations (see Section 4.4 below). In the DDM every possible
discourse unit type is associated with its own grammar which
specifies its characteristic constituent structure and is
interpreted according to specific rules of semantic
interpretation.
The basic unit of discourse formation is the discourse
constituent unit. For the purpose of joining with other clauses
to create a complex discourse, each clause is considered an
elementary discourse constituent unit (dcu). Dcu's are of three
types: list structures (including narratives, which are
sequentially ordered lists of events), expansion structures, in
which one unit gives more detail of some sort about some aspect
of a preceding unit, and binary structures such as "if/the,"
"and," "or," "but"--relations in which there is a logical
connective connecting the constituents.
Discourse Units (DU's) such as stories and descriptions,
arguments and plans are composed of dcu's which encode the
propositions which, taken together, and properly interpreted,
communicate elaborate semantic structures.
Dcu's and DU's in their turn, are the means of realization
of the information exchange which is so basic in Speech Events,
which are constituents of Interactions.
The DDM provides an account of the coherence relations in
texts by means of an explicit mechanism for computing the
semantic congruence and structural appropriateness of strings of
clauses (Polanyi, 1985; Hinrichs & Polanyi, 1986).
Simultaneously, it provides an account of the complexities of
interrupted or highly attenuated discourse by providing a uniform
treatment of all phenomena which can interrupt the completion of
an ongoing discourse unit: elaborations on a point just made,
digressions to discuss something else, interruptions of one
Speech Event by another or one ongoing Interaction by another.
All of these phenomena are treated as subordinated or embedded
relative to activities which continue the development of an
ongoing unit--whether it be a list of some sort, a story, or a
Speech Event or Interaction.
The structure which results from the recursive embedding and
sequencing of discourse units with respect to one another has the
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form of a tree. This Discourse History Parse Tree contains, for
any moment in the discourse, a record of which units of what
types have been completed, and which, having been interrupted
before completion, remain to be completed.
In determining whether an incoming clause is to be
coordinated, subordinated, or superordinated to the last clause
added to the Tree, the first step is to assign a set of contexts
of interpretation to the clause specifying to which Interaction,
Speech Event and Discourse Unit (if any) it belongs. The
propositional content of the clause is then parsed into a
semantic frame with slots for recording the temporal, spatial,
and participant parameters of the clause's interpretation, as
well as other important information.
The process of discourse segmentation with the DDM is a
process of clause parsing, assignment to contexts of
interpretation and search of only the rightmost Tree nodes for a
suitable partner. If a suitable partner is found, either a node
exists which permits the two to be joined, or if no suitable node
exists, a new node is created and labelled with the values of the
label of the node computed. The resultant Tree is therefore an
incremental description of the developing discourse which
reflects the surface structure relations, if any, between the
constituents. Interruptions are accommodated in the tree as
discourse embeddings in a way not dissimilar to their treatment
in the Discourse Structures Theory. However, in order to
accommodate the fact that what may be an interruption to one
participant--or from the point of view of one Interaction--may be
the ongoing discourse from another perspective; each participant
in a discourse is associated with a unique Discourse History
Parse Tree representing the individual's incremental analysis of
the history of the discourse. The degree to which participants'
trees are identical determines their ability to understand each
other's references to underdetermined elements in the discourse
such as pronomials, deictics, or definite noun phrases.
The structural aspects of the DDM just discussed are related
to the enterprise of developing an adequate discourse semantics--
one which would allow the meaning of a discourse to be built up
on a left-to-right basis, along with the structural analysis of
the discourse. Developing such a compositional semantics for
discourse presupposes adequate ways of representing the semantics
of both sentences and discourse, as well as effective ways of
dealing with the context dependence of utterance meanings.
These issues are discussed in Section 3.
3. The Meanings of the Text
3.1 Truth Conditions for Sentence and Text
Semantic studies in philosophical logic have focused on one
important aspect of the meaning of indicative sentences: The
truth conditions of the sentence, i.e., a characterization of
what must be the case in the world for the sentence to be seen as
true rather than false. The truth conditions of a sentence can
be mathematically described as a function from states of affairs
to truth values. Logical languages,. such as First Order
Predicate Calculus or Intensional Logic, provide formulas for
expressing such functions. (In an extensional logic, states of
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affairs are represented by "models" of the logical language; in
an intentional logic, they are represented by elementary
entities, called "possible worlds.")
This logical perspective on sentence meaning has had
considerable influence in linguistics and AI. Many theories and
systems account for the way in which the truth conditions of a
sentence depend on its surface form, by providing a definition or
procedure which translates a sentence into a formula of a logical
language. The same paradigm can be applied to texts consisting
of more than one sentence, since a report or description may also
be said to be "understood" (though in a limited sense) by someone
who knows what state of affairs in the world would make it
"true."
Carrying over the logical perspective on meaning from the
sentence level to the text level raises the question of how to
build up a logical representation for the truth conditions of a
text out of the logical representations of the truth conditions
of its constituent utterances. To do this, a text understanding
program must be able to recognize the structure of a text, and to
apply the semantic operations which build meanings at the levels
above the sentence. It must also deal correctly with the
sentence-level text constituents. Instead of analyzing the
meaning of isolated, independent sentences, it must determine the
meaning of particular utterances of sentences, taking into
account the context which has been set up by the previous
discourse.
Processing an individual utterance in a discourse thus
entails three distinct operations:
* determining the utterance meaning in the applicable
context;
* integrating the utterance meaning with the meaning of
the text as processed so far; and
* updating the context setting which will be used to
interpret the next utterance.
The context-dependence of utterance interpretation is shown
by several difficult phenomena. For instance, temporal, locative
or conditional interpretive frameworks may be introduced in the
first sentence of a discourse segment and have scope over all
other constituents of that segment. The reference time in a
narrative moves on as the narrative proceeds (Kamp, 1979;
Hinrichs, 1986; and Polanyi & Scha, 1984). Anaphoric expressions
may refer from a subordinate constituent to entities introduced
by its superordinate constituent, or from a constituent of a
coordinate paragraph to certain entities introduced by an earlier
constituent of that same paragraph.
3.2 Consequences for Logical Formalisms
Context-dependence. The context-dependence of utterance-
meanings in discourse can be dealt with by translating a sentence
not directly into a proposition, but into a function from
contexts to propositions, where by "context" one means a data
structure that contains all the relevant information that may
influence sentence interpretation: speaker, addressee, speech
time, speech location, reference time, candidates for anaphoric
reference, topic, etc. Formally, contexts are very similar to
indices as employed in Montague's systems (Montague, 1968;
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Bennett, 1978). The meaning of a particular utterance of a
sentence is then constructed by evaluating the sentence meaning
with respect to the proper context.
In processing an utterance, a discourse understanding system
must therefore determine what its proper context is--and also how
this utterance may create a new context, or modify existing ones,
for the interpretation of subsequent utterances. Polanyi and
Scha (1984) propose to use Woods' (1970) Augmented Transition
Network formalism to formulate a recursive definition of
discourse constituent structure which is coupled with semantic
rules that build up meaning representations for discourse
constituent units; the register mechanism of the ATN's is used to
keep track of the correct contexts in this process.
3.3 Discourse Anaphora
Beyond adopting a Montague-style context mechanism, some
other departures from standard logical practice may be necessary
to build up meaning representations for texts from meaning
representations for sentences.
Observations on anaphoric reference in discourse have
motivated some proposals for significant innovations in
representational formalisms, especially concerning the
representation of the denotation of indefinite noun phrases.
Several authors (including Karttunen, 1976) have argued that
indefinite noun phrases should be translated into "indefinite
entities" of some sort, as opposed to existential quantifiers.
For instance,
"John loves a woman."
would not be represented as
E x: Woman (x) and Love (J, x)
but rather as
Woman (u) and Love (J, u)
where u is a Skolem-constant--a constant whose denotation is
undetermined, therefore behaving, for all practical purposes,
like a variable which is implicitly existentially quantified.
Leaving the existential quantifier implicit has an advantage when
one deals with discourse anaphora.
"John loves a woman. Her name is Mary."
can be treated simply by conjoining the formula for "Her name is
Mary," with the one for "John loves a woman," while resolving the
pronoun "her" to corefer with the constant for "a woman:"
(Woman (u) and Love (J, u)) and name (u) - "Mary."
This procedure does not work if indefinite noun phrases are
represented by existential quantifiers:
(E x: Woman (x) and Love (J, x)) and name (x) - "Mary"
is infelicitous because a variable is used outside the scope of
its defining occurrence.
The perspective just sketched has been pushed furthest in a
formalism devised by Hans Kamp (1979). The formulas used in this
formalism are called Discourse Representation Structures (DRS's).
They serve the role of logical formulas, representing the meaning
of the text so far, as well as the role of contexts which set up
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the right reference times and anaphoric reference candidates for
the interpretation of next utterances.
DRS's differ from ordinary logical formulas in the way
variables are used. A DRS is defined to be true if it is
embeddable in a model which corresponds to the actual world.
Embeddability of DRSs is recursively defined on the structure of
the formulas.
An alternative approach to the problem of discourse anaphora
is described by Webber, where the representation of sentence
meanings is separated from the representation of "evoked
entities" (Webber, 1982).
3.4 Background Knowledge and Plausible Inferences.
Understanding a text involves much more than understanding
the literal meanings of its constituent utterances, and their
explicitly stated relations. The message of a text is rarely
completely explicit; the author relies on the fact that the
hearer/reader will integrate the meanings of the utterances with
an independently given set of background assumptions about the
domain and about the author. All implications which follow in a
simple and direct way from the combination of the explicit
utterances and the presupposed background knowledge are
considered to be implicit in the text.
For a system to be capable of discourse understanding in this
more extended sense, its mechanisms must be augmented with a
representation of the required background knowledge, and with a
system that performs inferences on the basis of explicit text
meanings and background knowledge, generating representations of
information that was implicit in the text. Different kinds of
background information play a role. Ideally, a discourse
understanding system should have a rather rich, encyclopedic
knowledge base or, at least, a knowledge base comparable to the
user's for the pertinent domain, and it should have particularly
good coverage in knowledge which people consider "common sense."
How to model common sense domains has therefore become a research
area in itself (Charniak, 1977; and Hobbs & Moore, 1985).
An important set of background assumptions which has
received a lot of attention concerns the characters in stories;
unless told otherwise, story-recipients must assume the
characters to be "normal," rational, purposeful people, and they
must bring these assumptions to bear on the text in order to make
sense of it. Various systems have been built which embody some
knowledge of this sort and bring it to bear on the discourse-
understanding process.
SAM (Cullingford, 1978, 1981; and Schank & Abelson, 1977),
for instance, is a system for understanding narratives, which is
based on the notion of a script. A script is a knowledge
structure which represents a stereotypical sequence of events,
such as taking a bus, going to a movie theatre, or going to a
restaurant for dinner. SAM's representation of a script consists
of a set of simple actions described as conceptual dependency
structures, together with the causal connections between those
actions. The actions in a script are further organized into a
sequence of scenes, which, in the case of the restaurant script,
includes entering the restaurant, ordering food, eating, paying,
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and leaving. Each script also has a set of roles and props
characterizing the people and objects that are expected to appear
in the sequence of events.
In processing a narrative about eating in a restaurant, SAM
first has to recognize that the restaurant script is the relevant
context for interpreting the narrative. Once the script is
chosen, SAM will try to interpret each new sentence as part of
that script. It does this by matching the conceptual
representation of the new sentence against the actions
represented in the script. When it finds a match, it
incorporates the sentence meaning into its representation of the
narrative. It also fills in the script actions preceding the one
matched. By this process, SAM infers actions that are implicit
in the narrative it is reading. Thus, when it reads the
narrative:
John went to the Fisherman's Grotto for dinner.
He ordered lobster. The bill was outrageous.
it includes in its representation that John actually ate his
lobster, that he received a large bill, and that he paid it.
A later system, FRUMP (DeJong, 1979a, 1979b), pushes the
idea of expectation-driven understanding a little further and
dispenses with script-independent meaning representations
altogether; it parses its input text directly into script-slots,
and anything which does not fit is ignored. (FRUMP is presented
as a model of human text skimming.) IPP (Levin & Moore, 1977;
and Sidner & Israel, 1981), in its turn modifies the FRUMP
approach by mixing script-based text skimming with a somewhat
more careful semantic analysis of selected parts of the text.
Its meaning representations contain not only scripts with filled-
in slots, but also representations of "unexpected events."
In a realistic application of the script approach, the
scripts to be invoked must be selected from thousands of
candidates; SAM chose from only three or four. Furthermore, one
will have to drop SAM's assumption that each script contains one
event that is always explicitly mentioned in the text in order to
invoke the script. The task of finding which of the many
candidate scripts matches the input sequence best thus presents
computational problems which deserve further study.
The idea of a "script" is usually associated with the
description of predefined sequences of events which constitute
the "building blocks" of everyday life. Almost by definition,
scripts are not sufficient to understand interesting stories.
Real stories tend to involve somewhat more complex plots, arising
from conflicts between the perceptions, ideas, and goals of the
different characters. A program that interprets its input
reports in terms of the goals and subgoals of the protagonist is
PAM (Plan Applier Mechanism), designed by Wilensky (1981).
Later work derives plot structure from "interacting plans,"
that is, plans involving two or more participants in cooperative
or competitive interaction. Such plans differ from single
participant plans in several ways (see Bruce, 1986); the most
significant being that they are produced, interpreted, and
executed in a belief context, i.e., what participants believe
about the interaction is significant, rather than any putative
objective account of the events.
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Thus, for example, in order for a system to make sense of a
children's story such as "Hansel and Gretel," it must monitor the
evolution of the children's, the parents', and the witch's
beliefs about events as well as the events themselves (Bruce &
Newman, 1978). When the parents tell the children that the
family is going to "fetch wood," the system must note that the
actions the parents subsequently take are designed to be
interpretable by the children as simple wood fetching, but are
simultaneously effecting the abandonment of Hansel and Gretel.
Moreover, it must be able to compute embedded beliefs, e.g., the
parents do not know that Hansel has overheard their plan and,
hence, that he believes that they intend him to believe the
actions contribute to wood fetching, but, in fact, are intended
to lead to his and Gretel's death. Central to this belief
monitoring is the computation of mutual belief (Allen, 1979;
Bruce & Newman, 1978; and Cohen, 1984) i.e., those beliefs fully
shared and known to be shared among the participants.
Mechanisms for interacting plans calculations have been
outlined in some detail (Bruce & Newman, 1978), but not fully
implemented in any current systems. Analyses in terms of
interacting plans have proved useful in studies of conversations
(Bruce, 1986), classroom interactions, skits (Newman & Bruce,
1986), and written stories (Bruce & Newman, 1978; Bruce, 1980a,
1980b).
3.5 Summarizing Stories
Understanding a story as a communicative object requires
more than dealing with its explicit content and the associated
plausible inferences. When someone tells a story, not all the
information reported is equally important. Truly understanding
the story would mean, among other things, being able to see the
distinctions between more important and less important
information. Evidence of this kind of understanding would be a
system's capability to generate adequate summaries of input
texts.
Many approaches to the story understanding problem have been
proposed. Four of them are discussed below; they are based,
respectively, on surface text phenomena, on lot structure, on
affective dynamics, and on the author-reader relationship.
The first approach implements the ideas formulated by
Polanyi concerning the way in which human storytellers encode
their information. She maintains that people explicitly mark the
relative salience of different pieces of information in a text;
they make sure that an important piece of information "stands
out" against the surrounding information. They do this by means
of meta-comments, of various evaluative devices: explicit
markers, repetition, and the use of encoding forms which deviate
from the "local norm" in the text (long versus short sentences,
direct discourse versus narrated events, colloquial versus formal
register, etc.) (Polanyi, 1985).
Based on these ideas, a system was developed that simply
counts the number of evaluative devices used to highlight each
proposition in a story and then puts the most highly evaluated
states and the most highly evaluated events together in a summary
of the input story. The system thus manages to construct a
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reasonable summary on the basis of the surface appearance of the
story, without understanding it in any sense; it shows that we
must be careful in ascribing "understanding" capabilities to a
system which performs a specific task.
The relevant work on plot structure originates with Propp
(1968) and Rumelhart (1975). Lehnert (1981; Lehnert, Black, &
Reiser, 1981; Lehnert, 1983; and Lehnert & Loiselle, 1985)
developed a summarization algorithm based on the causal relations
between the events and states reported in a story. By inspecting
the network of causal connections, it concludes that certain
events play a crucial role in the development of narratives, by
moving the plot from one place to an essentially different place.
Closely related to Lehnert's work is Dyer's (1981, 1983)
system, called BORIS, which attempts "in-depth understanding" of
narratives. Such understanding should include being able to
summarize the point or moral that the author intended the
narrative to represent. This work moves beyond earlier work on
plan-based understanding, such as Wilensky's (1981), by
abstracting the communicative intent.
BORIS embodies thematic patterns, called Thematic
Abstraction Units (TAUs). For example, TAU-DIRE-STRAITS encodes
the pattern: x has a crisis goal; x can't resolve the crisis
alone; x seeks a friend y to help out. TAUs arise from errors in
planning or plan execution. They refer to a plan used, its
intended effect, why it failed, and what can be done about the
failure. As such, they allow BORIS to organize the narratives at
an intentional level, which leads naturally to an appropriate
summarization or even drawing of a moral.
A contrasting approach is that of Brewer and Lichtenstein
(1981, 1982). They argue that stories are a subclass of
narratives whose purpose is to entertain. Thus, plan-based
analyses ultimately miss the point of a story if they are not
augmented by an effective component, one that shows how
structural elements of the text influence the reader. For
example, suspense is created when the author reveals that a
negative outcome is in store for a central character and that the
character is unaware of his or her fate. Thus, relations among
the author's, the reader's, and the characters' belief states
become essential to understanding, or being affected by, the
story.
In the line of the Brewer and Lichtenstein approach, Bruce
(1980b) outlines a central model of the author-reader
relationship. The model makes explicit not only the author and
the reader as participants in the communicative act, but also a
constellation of other implied participants. For instance, in an
ironic text, the author establishes an apparent speaker with
beliefs and intentions which conflict in some respects with her
own.
It is noteworthy that to date attempts such as those of
Brewer, Lichtenstein, and Bruce have been purely theoretical; no
working system addresses the interactions of author's and
reader's goals at that level.
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4. Plan Recognition
4.1 The Pragmatic Perspective on Discourse
Language, especially written language, is often viewed as a
code for packaging and transmitting information from one
individual to another. Under this view, a linguistic message is
fully represented by the words and sentences it comprises; texts
are thus objects that can be studied in isolation. By taking
such a stance, one is led naturally, for instance, to regard
words as referring back to other words. Concepts like coherence,
relevance, and topic are then regarded as properties of texts,
leading researchers to confine their search for these properties
to words and sentences.
A contrasting view, proposed by Strawson (1950), Austin
(1962), Searle (1969), and others is that speakers or writers use
words to do things, for instance, to refer to things, or to get a
hearer or reader to believe or do something. They are produced
by a person, who is attempting to use them to produce certain
effects on an audience (perhaps an imagined audience). According
to this view, utterances are tools used in social interaction and
should be studied in that light.
Morgan and Sellner (1980) suggest that properties like
coherence, relevance, and text structure are likely to be
obtained from a theory of plans and goals appropriately extended
to linguistic actions. Properties like "relevance" would be
epiphenomenal byproducts of the appropriate structuring of
actions.
Pragmatics is the study of communication as it is situated
relative to a particular set of communication demands, speakers,
hearers, times, places, joint surroundings, linguistic
conventions, and cultural practices. Including language in a
theory of action, this suggests that "pragmatics" is just the
application to verbal problems of general abilities for
interpreting the everyday world (see Morgan, 1978, for fuller
discussion). People tend to interpret the behavior of other
humans in terms of the situation and the actor's intention and
beliefs. Much of what has been discussed under the rubric
pragmatics is most reasonably seen as the interpretation of
linguistic behavior in similar terms.
The pragmatic perspective on language has three important
implications for discourse understanding research. The first is
that the meaning of a linguistic message is only partly
represented by its content; its meaning for a hearer also depends
on the hearer's construal of the purpose that the speaker had for
producing it. The second is that the attribution of intentions
to a speaker must be an integral component of the listener's
comprehension process. The third is that a theory of language
comprehension should determine the extent to which the same
strategies people use to arrive at satisfactory explanations of
the physical behavior of others can be employed in their
comprehension of speech acts.
The way the meaning of a message is shaped by its producer's
goals and beliefs is most obvious in a case such as propaganda,
but it is no less critical for apparently straightforward
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utterances. For example, a colleague at the office might say,
"I brought two egg salad sandwiches today." Although the
referential meaning of this statement might be simple to compute,
its full meaning depends on whether the speaker's intention was,
for example, to offer one of the sandwiches, to decline a
luncheon invitation, or to explain why the office smelled bad.
Whatever the speaker's goals, the meaning conveyed by the
statement depends on the hearer's correctly inferring what they
are (Adams & Bruce, 1982).
Thus, understanding discourse requires inferring the
intentions and beliefs that led the speaker to produce the
observed behavior. But as Grice (1957) points out, simply
recognizing an actor's plan, as an unseen observer might do (cf.
Schmidt, Sridharan, & Goodson, 1979; and, Wilensky, 1981), is
insufficient as a basis for communication. Instead, hearers
should attribute to speakers intentions that the speakers intend
for them to infer. To ensure successful communication, speakers
attempt to maximize the likelihood that hearers will make the
inferences they were supposed to make by relying on what Lewis
(1969) terms "conventions." Conventions are solutions to
coordination problems--where any participant's actions depend on
the actions of others--and themselves rely on "mutual knowledge"
held amongst the parties involved. Mutual knowledge (see also
Schiffer, 1972) occurs when two people know that a proposition P
holds, that the other person knows as well that P holds, that the
second knows that the first knows that P holds, and so on. In
ordinary conversation, participants make assumptions about mutual
knowledge, signal their assumptions through the pragmatic
presuppositions (Stalnaker, 1974) of their utterances, and
negotiate misunderstanding of the developing mutual knowledge.
4.2 Speech Acts
From a pragmatic perspective, the goal of discourse
understanding should not be to merely assess the truth conditions
of one's interlocutor's utterances. Instead, one should be
concerned with the goal which is being pursued through these
utterances, and with the way in which every utterance contributes
to that goal. From this perspective, every language utterance is
viewed as a social act; it changes, be it perhaps on a small
scale, the social relation between the speaker and his
interlocutor. A simple assertion puts me under the obligation to
defend it if challenged. A question creates for my interlocutor
the obligation to answer it or to be prepared to justify his lack
of an inclination to do so. And vows, promises and threats
clearly extend beyond the micro-sociology of the interactional
situation, creating commitments in the social world at large.
The social acts performed by means of linguistic utterances are
called Speech Acts (Searle, 1969).
The Speech Act types which play a role in current
experimental dialogue systems are:
* Requests, typically formulated as questions of the form
"Could you do X"
* Commands, directly expressed as imperative sentences.("Do X") Notice that for most programs, which slavishly
try to satisfy every whim of their human dialogue
partner, there is no distinction between a request and
a command. The program takes no responsibility for its
actions.
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* Assertions, directly expressed as indicative sentences.
Assertions are usually interpreted as commands to store
and/or evaluate the asserted information.
* Questions, directly expressed as interrogative
sentence. A question is usually interpreted as a
command to provide the answer.
4.3 Plan Recognition
If a system analyzes its input utterances as speech acts and
has at its disposal a repertoire of plausible goals that its
dialogue partner may pursue, it may be able to understand the
purpose behind its input utterances by using a method which is
reminiscent of the way in which a system like PAM (Wilensky,
1981) understands reports about goal-oriented behavior; it tries
to guess the more encompassing goal that the speaker may be
trying to accomplish by executing a plan which has the surface
speech act as one of its subgoals.
A system that tries to derive the deeper intentions behind
surface speech acts in exactly this way was developed by Allen
(1979). His system exploits knowledge about what constitutes a
rational plan, as well as beliefs about what goals the speaker is
likely to have.
The plan inference process is specified as a set of
inference rules and a control strategy. Rules are all of the
form "If agent S believes agent A has a goal X, then agent S may
infer that agent A has a goal Y." Examples of such rules are:
If S believes A has a goal of executing action
ACT, and ACT has an effect E, then S may believe
that A has a goal of achieving E.
If S believes A has a goal of knowing whether a
proposition P is true, then S may believe that A
has a goal of achieving P.
Of course, given the conditions in the second rule, S might
alternatively infer that A has a goal of achieving not P; this is
treated as a separate rule. Which of these rules applies in a
given setting is determined by control heuristics, as follows.
The plan inference process can be viewed as a search through
a set of partial plans. Each partial plan consists of two parts:
one part is constructed using the plan inference rules from the
observed action, and the other is constructed using the plan
construction rules on an expected goal. When mutually exclusive
rules can be applied to one of these partial plans, the plan is
copied and one rule is applied in each copy. Each of these
partial plans is then rated as to how probable it is to be the
correct plan. The highest rated partial plan is always selected
for further expansion using the inference rules. The rating is
determined using a set of heuristics that fall into two classes:
those that evaluate how well-formed the plan is in the given
context and those that evaluate how well the plan fits the
expectations. An example of a heuristic is:
Decrease the rating of a partial plan if it contains a
goal that is already true in the present context.
Allen argues that whenever the intended plan can be derived
from mutual knowledge, i.e., from knowledge which is knowingly
shared between speaker and hearer, the hearer is assumed to
perceive the intended plan, and is expected to react to that
plan, rather than to the surface speech act. The paradigm
examples of such situations are known as indirect speech acts
(Perrault & Allen, 1980): sentences like:
Discourse Understanding - 41
Discourse Understanding - 42
"Can you pass the salt?"
or
"Is the salt near you?"
uttered at the dinner table where the simple answer "Yes,"
without an accompanying action, would be experienced as a joke or
an insult.
The idea also applies, however, to cases that are normally
not classified as indirect speech acts. For instance, when at
the information counter of a train station someone asks:
"Does the 4:20 train go to Toronto?"
the answer "No" is less helpful than the answer
"No, but the 5:10 train does."
which responds to the speaker's perceived goal of going to
Toronto.
Allen's plan recognition paradigm has been developed in work
by Sidner (Sidner & Israel, 1981; Sidner, 1983, 1985).
Pollack (1986) has refined it to deal with situations where
speaker and hearer have conflicting ideas about how certain goals
may be achieved. Litman (1986; Litman & Allen, 1984), has
introduced meta-plans which allow for clarification subdialogues
and plan corrections; she also integrates an awareness of the
surface structure of discourse, as discussed in section 2 above,
into the plan-recognition process.
4.4 Speech Events
An "unframed" interaction between "uninterpreted" people is
a rare event. People use a refined system of subcategorization
to classify the social situations they engage in. These
subcategories, called Speech Event types (Hymes, 1967, 1972),
often assign a specific purpose to the interaction, specify roles
for the participants, constrain discourse topics and
conversational registers, and, in many cases, specify a
conventional sequence of component activities.
An awareness of what kind of Speech Event one is engaged in,
thus helps the plan recognition process; the overall goals of the
interaction, and often the steps to achieve them, are shared
knowledge among the participants.
The most precisely circumscribed kinds of Speech Events are
formal rituals. Speech Event types characterized by grammars
which are less explicit and less detailed include service
encounters (Merritt, 1978), doctor-patient interactions (Byrne &
Long, 1976), and casual conversations. Schegloff (Schegloff &
Sacks, 1973) has shown that the process of terminating a
telephone conversation is a jointly constructed ending sequence
unit with a predictable course of development.
The structure of talk which is exchanged in order to perform
a task may follow the structure of some goal/subgoal analysis of
this task (Allen, 1979). In Speech Event types which involve a
more or less fixed goal, this often leads to a fixed grammar of
subsequent steps taken to attain it. For instance, as described
by Polanyi and Scha (1984), transcripts of the activities in
Dutch butcher shops consistently display the following sequential
structure in the interaction between the butcher and a customer:
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1. It is established that it is this customer's turn.
2. The first desired item is ordered, and the order is
dealt with, . . . . then the desired
item is ordered and the order is dealt with.
3. It is established that the sequence of orders is
finished.
4. The bill is processed.
5. The interaction is concluded.
Each of these steps is filled in in a large variety of
ways--either of the parties may take the initiative at each step,
question/answer sequences about the available meat, the right way
to prepare it, or the exact wishes of the customer may all be
embedded in the stage 2 steps, and clarification dialogs of
various sorts may occur. In other words, we find the whole
repertoire of possibilities admitted by the discourse grammar.
An important Speech Event type with characteristics slightly
different from the types mentioned so far, is the casual
conversation. In a casual conversation, all participants have
the same role: to be "equals;" no purposes are pre-established;
and the range of possible topics is open-ended, although
conventionally constrained.
4.5 Dialogue Systems
Many dialogue systems have been designed to partake in
specific types of speech events, in which the computer system and
its human interlocutor each play a well-defined role. The
assumption that every dialogue must fall within the patterns
allowed by the speech event type makes it possible to resolve
ambiguities in its input (anaphora, ellipsis) and to react to the
intentions behind it, also when these are not explicitly stated.
Most systems of this sort play the role of the "professional" in
a consultation interaction of some sort. Examples are:
* a system that teaches an assembly task (Hobbs, 1979)
* an information system at a train station (Allen, 1979)
* a travel budget manager (Bruce, 1980)
* a Rogerian psychotherapist
Such speech event types involve the participants cooperating
towards a common goal. In doing this, they decompose the common
task into subtasks, and, eventually, into elementary subtasks
that can be executed by one or both of the participants without
requiring further dialogue. For instance, as discussed earlier
(Section 2.2.2), Grosz's original investigation of dialogues
between a human instructor and an apprentice who was being told
how to assemble a water pump, showed that the structure of such
dialogues corresponds closely to the structure of the task
(Grosz, 1974).
One should notice, however, that the description of the task
structure does not predict one fixed tree structure (Grosz,
1974). A task may involve subtasks that must all be done, but
can be done in any order. It is not difficult to imagine further
complexities: alternatives, preconditions, etc. When a task
does specify one fixed sequence of subtasks, the task structure
degenerates into a script (cf. section 3.4).
5. Modes of Natural Language
We tend to think of language coming to us in one of two
forms: oral or written. Thus, AI research on Discourse
Understanding is conveniently divided between research on
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understanding text and research on participating in interactive
dialogues, which, although most often written rather than spoken,
are thought of as analogous to oral conversations. That this
division is inadequate and at times misleading, is shown by Rubin
(1980), who postulates eight dimensions of variation among
"language experiences."
The eight dimensions: (1) oral versus written modality, (2)
interactiveness, (3) spatial commonality, (4) temporal
commonality, (5) possibility of para-linguistic communication,
(6) concreteness of referents, (7) audience specificity, and (8)
separability of participants, define a range of communication
modalities out of which AI research has focused on only a few,
albeit significant ones.
Most AI research (notable exceptions being speech
understanding work and some efforts at modeling real
conversations (Reichman, 1981; Hobbs & Evans, 1980; Hobbs & Agar,
1985; Levin & Moore, 1977; and Hinrichs & Polanyi, 1986) has
focused on written language and is thus clustered on one pole of
Rubin's first dimension. What distinguishes the AI dialogue work
from the AI text work then is that the former is interactive, and
usually implies spatial and temporal commonality. On the other
hand, neither of the two modes of language use includes para-
linguistic communication, such as gestures, facial expressions,
or body position cues. In some of the dialogue work, but not the
text work, there are concrete referents, in the sense that
objects are perceptually present to the user and the machine. The
same holds for audience specificity; some of the dialogue work
assumes fairly detailed speaker models of the hearer. Neither of
the modalities typically allows separability of participants.
Indeed, most of the communication is one to one.
From the perspective of this dimensional analysis, the
research directed at the implementation of interactive computer
programs that display reasonable behavior in conducting a
dialogue with a person amounts to the development of a new mode
of natural language, rather than the analysis of an existing one:
real-time alphanumeric interaction, usually without shared
awareness of physical context. Other AI research has focused on
text understanding, usually assuming a non-specific audience.
(In contrast, note the many existing forms of text understanding,
such as dealing with letters, memos, persuasive essys, etc.,
which do assume specific audience beliefs and plans).
Some studies (Cohen, Fertig, & Starr, 1982; Cohen, 1984;
and Tierney, LaZansky, Raphael, & Cohen, 1983) have been devoted
to the linguistic consequences of the use of different
communication media. Cohen (1984), for example, used a plan-
based model of communication to analyze dialogues in five
modalities: face-to-face, telephone, linked CRT's, (non-
interactive) audio tape, and (non-interactive) written text. He
found that speakers in the face-to-face situation, for example,
attempted to achieve more detailed goals in giving instructions
than did users of keyboards. More specifically, requests that
the hearer identify the referent of a noun phrase dominated
spoken instruction giving discourse, but were rare in the
keyboard dialogues.
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These studies suggest that it is important to understand the
constraints of the communication system as well as the texts per
se when an AI system is being designed. Moreover, they imply a
need for caution in interpreting results of AI research. Any
form of language use is valid to examine and can be illuminating
in a general way, but specifics of language processing must be
interpreted in light of the communication modality in which they
arise.
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